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Why they join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadi Organizations 
Julie Chernov Hwang and Kirsten E. Schulze 
 
Why do Indonesian Muslims join Islamist extremist groups?  This article explores four pathways to 
entry into Indonesian militant groups:  study groups, local conflict, kinship and schools.  It argues that 
within all four of these pathways, social bonds and relationships are the common thread both in 
encouraging entry as well as in fostering commitment. Specifically, these relationships contribute to 
the formation and eventual consolidation of the identity as a member of the jihadi group through 
regular participation in activities, attending meetings, narrowing the circle of friends to those within 
the group, and participating in increasingly risky and possibly violent activities together.  Drawing on 
original fieldwork including 49 interviews with current and former members of Jemaah Islamiyah, 
Mujahidin KOMPAK, Darul Islam, Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, Indonesia’s pro-ISIS network and other 
jihadist groups as well as 57 depositions and court documents, this article explores the development 
and evolution of these pathways and how relational ties play a role in each. 
 
 Anas’ pathway into extremism began in high school, when he was invited by a 
classmate to participate in what he had been told was a Salafi study group.
1
 He enjoyed the 
group because, unlike other Islamic study sessions he had participated in, this one addressed 
jihad not as something remote or abstract but in such a way that “nurtured their spirits” for it.2   
From this broader study group, he was invited into a more exclusive one run by the 
Indonesian Islamist extremist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), although its affiliation was not 
disclosed to him at that time.  There, he was taught the Quran and aspects of the JI 
worldview. Throughout he was observed and assessed to see whether he showed sufficient 
commitment to become a member of JI.  When JI began sending fighters to the Indonesian 
island of Ambon, where conflict between Christians and Muslims had broken out, Anas 
wanted to go; he was ready for that commitment. However, his seniors refused, noting he had 
not done his military training. Not content with that answer, he circumvented JI and went to 
Ambon anyway.  Despite this act of defiance, Anas was permitted to take his military training 
with JI in Ambon and gained fighting experience. When he returned home, he continued to 
socialize with JI members and to participate in JI activities. In 2001, after four years of 
activities at various levels in JI, Anas was finally deemed sufficiently committed and was 
allowed to take the loyalty oath – the bai’at. Now Anas was officially a member.  
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How do Indonesian Muslims like Anas join Islamist extremist groups? This article 
examines four entry points into Indonesian militant Islamist groups: pengajian (Islamic study 
groups), local conflict, kinship, and schools. It argues that within all four of these pathways, 
social bonds and relationships were the common thread both in encouraging entry as well as 
in fostering commitment.  Specifically, these relationships contributed to the formation and 
eventual consolidation of a group-specific jihadi identity through regular participation in 
activities, attendance of meetings, narrowing the circle of friends to those within the group, 
cooperation with other group members, and embracing an increasingly risky and possibly 
violent trajectory.  
It is important to note that these pathways were and are not fixed. As Islamist 
extremist groups in Indonesia evolved in response to changing internal conditions and 
external contexts, aspects of those pathways also evolved. Time in study groups and vetting 
processes also varied from organization to organization. Regardless of these small but 
significant shifts, social bonds remained critical to joining. Data permitting, this article will 
illustrate this in-pathway variation and highlight the in-pathway evolution since the 
emergence of the Darul Islam movement. 
One point of relative consensus within the terrorism studies literature is that joining 
an extremist group is a process.
3
 John Horgan and Max Taylor point to multiple routes into 
terrorism, which are fostered by the interaction effect between an individual’s political, 
economic, familial and organizational context, on the one hand and personal factors, 
including dissatisfaction with the sense of self, on the other.
4
 Andrew Silke, similar to 
Horgan and Taylor addresses terrorism as a process of becoming, highlighting specific 
factors, including youthful disobedience, opportunity, a desire for vengeance, and, in some 
instances, status.
5
  The research underpinning this article shows that for Indonesians joining 
and becoming a committed member of a jihadi group was indeed a process and often a quite 
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lengthy one. It thus concurs with Silke, Horgan and Taylor. It also shows the critical 
importance of the peer group as emphasized by Marc Sageman in his work on the role of 
informal social and friendship networks
6
 as well as Donatella Della Porta in her research on 
in-group activities and in-group friends.
7
  Friendships, however, are not the only salient type 
of relationship. Equally important are kinship relations and teacher-student relations which 
function as constructed kin relationships.
8
 In the Indonesian context, Sidney Jones has noted 
the prevalence of multi-generational jihadi families in Jemaah Islamiyah communities.
9
  
Similarly, Sulastri Osman’s research on kinship and teacher-student ties in Jemaah Islamiyah 
explored discipleship as well as how participation in extremist groups is passed from 
grandfather to father to son.
10
   
This article draws upon a dataset of 106 Indonesians, who joined militant Islamist 
organisations between the mid-1980s and 2014, and analyses their individual pathways.  
Forty-nine were gathered by interview in the cities of Jakarta, Bekasi, Semarang, Kudus, 
Surabaya, Poso, Palu, Ampana, Pekanbaru and Ambon.
 11
 Of those, twenty one were 
members of Jemaah Islamiyah, although nine of those were initially recruited into Darul 
Islam and later switched to Jemaah Islamiyah, after the latter splintered from the former. 
Fourteen were members of local Poso jihadi groups: Tanah Runtuh (12), and Mujahidin 
Kayamanya (2). Seven were members of Mujahidin KOMPAK. Two were members of the 
pro-ISIS network including one recruiter; one was a participant in Indonesian takfiri cleric 
Aman Abdurrahman’s study sessions; and two were members of Al-Qaeda in the Malay 
Archipelago. Another two were members of the salafi paramilitary group, Laskar Jihad.  
These interviews were augmented by 57 depositions and court documents, mostly covering 
the pro-ISIS networks and the new generation of Jemaah Islamiyah, who Indonesian 
authorities refer to as Neo-JI.   
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This article looks at four pathways into Indonesian jihadi organisations. First, it 
examines how Islamic study groups became the pathway of choice for outsiders — those who 
did not grow up in a jihadi family or attend a jihadi school. Second, it discusses how local 
conflicts motivated individuals to form and join Islamist extremist organizations and the role 
played by fighters from other parts of Indonesia in stimulating the development of those 
groups. Third, it explores the phenomenon of multi-generational jihadi families drawing on 
Jemaah Islamiyah and Darul Islam families where this route is most resonant. Finally, it 
analyses the role of schools in identifying and grooming potential recruits.  The primary 
focus in these pathways is on four main groups: Darul Islam, Jemaah Islamiyah, Tanah 
Runtuh, and Mujahidin KOMPAK. Where data is available, there are also references to the 
pro-ISIS network.
12
   
 
Why Indonesia? 
If one wants to understand why Muslims join Islamist extremist groups, Indonesia, the 
world’s largest Muslim nation, provides a wealth of information. Indonesia has long had an 
Islamist extremist fringe dating back to the 1948-1965 Darul Islam rebellions
13
 and 
subsequent Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) movement.  The landscape of this 
fringe has been characterized by factionalization and fragmentation, diverging typically over 
issues of ideology, personality, and, importantly, where and under what conditions violence is 
permissible.
14
 The most notable of the DI splinter groups was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which 
was established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.  A faction within JI 
carried out a campaign of violence, including the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2001 
Atrium Mall bombing, the 2002 Bali bombings, and the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing.
15
 That 
faction later formed its own independent cell, Al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago, which 
carried out the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 
Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotel bombings.
16
  In 2008, JI co-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir left 
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the organization and established Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), which operated partially 
above ground and partially clandestinely.
17
  In 2014, JAT split following Ba’asyir’s decision 
to support ISIS, leading those who opposed ISIS to form Jamaah Ansharus Syariah (JAS). 
Communal conflict in Poso (Central Sulawesi province) and Ambon (Maluku 
province) between 1998 and 2007 also gave rise to local jihadi groups, which were affiliated 
with JI as well as Mujahidin KOMPAK. This article looks at the entry process of two Poso-
based affiliates: Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh (also referred to as Tanah Runtuh) and Mujahidin 
Kayamanya. These local conflict-oriented groups had far lower entry barriers and greatly 
expedited pathways to membership compared to Jemaah Islamiyah, where it frequently took 
upwards of a year and as long as five years until the bai’at (loyalty oath).  
Since 2013 Indonesia has also seen the emergence of a pro-ISIS network which was 
responsible for the 2016 Jakarta attack, the 2016 Solo police station suicide bombing, and the 
2017 Jakarta Kampung Melayu attack. This network was grafted onto an array of existing   
Islamist extremist groups. Most of these are loosely organised under the umbrella of Jamaah 
Ansharut Daulah (JAD) led by takfiri cleric Aman Abdurahhman or associated with the much 
smaller network led by former JI member Abu Husna.
18
 These groups and networks are 
linked to Indonesians who have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
19
    Most notable when looking 
at the pro-ISIS network as a whole is that the selection criteria, and induction processes are 
much looser than any of the other Indonesian militant organisations. This article will discuss 
these pro-ISIS groups within each of the four pathways – pengajian (Islamic study groups), 




The highly factionalized landscape of militant Islamism in Indonesia offers rich 
opportunities for those seeking to understand the pathways through which Indonesians have 
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joined and are joining Islamist extremist groups. Moreover, the cross-group variation allows 
for the identification of patterns across movements, regions, roles, generations, and history.  
  
The Pengajian pathway 
Pengajian (Islamic study groups) are widespread across Indonesia covering the full 
religious spectrum from traditionalist to modernist and from moderate to radical Islam. Not 
surprisingly, they have also been the most common pathway into Indonesian Islamist 
extremist groups. Indeed, 87 of the 106 militant Islamists in the dataset for this article joined 
through radical pengajian. They were a key component in the recruitment of Muslims into 
the Darul Islam movement (DI) and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) network since the 1980s as 
well as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) since 1993, and they continue to be crucial for understanding 
how Muslims have joined pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia since 2013.  
Radical Islamic study groups have functioned autonomously as well as in conjunction 
with other pathways such as schools and local conflict. In their more exclusive form 
pengajian prepare a prospective member for induction into a particular Islamist organisation; 
in their more public form they aim at reaching out to the broader community through dakwah 
(Islamic propagation) in order to gain supporters and sympathisers. Both forms have been 
crucial to forming new relationships, separating the pious Muslim from the secular one, 
separating the jihadi from the “simply” pious, and separating a member or prospective 
member of a particular organisation from the broader jihadi environment.  The strong social 
bonds formed in the more exclusive Islamic study sessions ensure both loyalty to the ihkwan 
(brothers) in that particular study group as well as the militant Islamist organisation.  
  Jemaah Islamiyah’s recruitment process through pengajian from its establishment in 
1993 until 2002 was a tightly controlled one aimed at establishing a completely reliable and 
committed membership bound by loyalty not just to the amir but also their fellow ikhwan.  
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From being first “spotted” for potential recruitment in a public pengajian through the 
different stages of more exclusive pengajian could take anywhere from 18 months to five 
years.
21
  The duration of time in the study group depended on the level of commitment shown 
at the various stages, the frequency of attendance, and relationships built inside. This 
rigorousness and length as well as the formation and reshaping of relationships is illustrated 
by example of Yusuf, who joined JI via the pengajian pathway.  
Yusuf developed an interest in Islam as a young adult in the mid-1990s. He was 
already working when he started attending Islamic study sessions at the Baitul Amin 
Muhammadiyah pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Jombang in the evenings. One of the 
Muhammadiyah teachers, who sympathised with JI, directed Yusuf and others to attend 
pengajian held by an ustadz (teacher) from the nearby JI pesantren Darus Syahadah.  
After becoming friendly with this ustadz, Yusuf started going to his house to learn 
about Islamic education and tauhid (oneness of God). “First I studied Islam then I learnt 
about jihad. We also discussed the way the regime had treated [JI founders] Abdullah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.”22 As the Darus Syahadah Islamic study sessions were 
more intensive than all the others he had attended, he wanted to join this group even though 
he did not know who they were at the time. Yusuf then attended what he called pengajian 
khusus (special Islamic studies sessions) and became part of a group of 20 people for nearly 
two years. These special study sessions were closed to the public and held in private houses. 
They were taught by a variety of ustadz from the jamaah. “One teacher was from [Bali 
bomber] Amrozi’s pesantren [Al-Islam], one was from Solo, and one was from Baitul 
Amin.”23 
From there Yusuf was invited by an ustadz from Al-Islam to join an intensive 3-day 
course referred to as MTI, short for Manhaj Taklimat Islamiyah (Islamic Briefing Material), 
the first part of which – MTI1 - covered aqidah (faith) and ibadah (worship). This was 
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followed by 3 days of tadrib (military training) in the mountains which included hiking, 
running, camping, and survival skills. Subsequently, it was expected that the members would 
stop having friends outside the community and would follow the rules of the community, 
isolating themselves from outsiders and interacting only with in-group friends.   
After around 6 months of further pengajian khusus Yusuf was invited to attend MTI 2 
which covered iman (belief), hijrah (migration) and the bai’at (oath). The MTI also 
addressed jihad which it defined in narrow military terms as qital fisabillah (war in the way 
of Allah) and considered obligatory.
24
 At MTI 2 Yusuf met recruits from other places for the 
first time. The Islamic studies sessions now shifted from the pengajian khusus level to the 
even more exclusive halaqah (Islamic studies circle) level. “In the halaqah we learned that 
you don’t just join jamaah Islam (the Islamic community) but Jemaah Islamiyah. However, I 
did not properly understand what that meant until the bai’at.”25 With his bai’at in 1999, 
Yusuf reached a key commitment point and became part of a tightly knit, exclusive 
community. He was given a role, briefly becoming the deputy head for Jombang district. 
Then, he reached a second commitment point. He was offered the opportunity to train at 
Camp Abu Bakar in the Philippines in January 2000, thus becoming part of JI’s Mindanao 
generation. At each of these points his relationship with JI was strengthened. 
Yusuf’s exhaustive description of the pengajian pathway into JI, shows that entry into 
JI as an outsider – as someone not from a jihadi family or JI school -  was a painstakingly 
slow process going from large, public study sessions to increasingly smaller, exclusive, 
closed, and secretive ones. This gradual process of indoctrination and socialization ensured 
that only the most committed recruits became members. It enabled a careful assessment of 
the individual’s character, and it assured that by the time he became a member, his circle of 
friends and mentors had narrowed and become focused on the in-group.   
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JI’s pengajian pathway gained in importance after the 2002 Bali bombings when JI’s 
schools came under scrutiny. At the same time, however, the joining process became less 
rigorous and more ad hoc as JI evolved into a “looser” organisation following the post-Bali 
arrest of significant numbers of key JI cadres while the remaining cadres went underground. 
A second series of arrests hit JI in 2007 in the context of the end of the Poso conflict which 
prompted JI to take a step back from jihad in Indonesia but also triggered reorganisation 
followed by a period of consolidation.
 26
  
 Pengajian have also been at the heart of this “new” Jemaah Islamiyah’s recruitment 
strategy. Indeed, almost all of those the Indonesian police refers to as “Neo-JI” arrested 
between 2014 and 2016 in connection with producing, possessing, transporting, and storing 
weapons and explosives, came to JI through pengajian. Moreover, almost all of them were 
“spotted” initially at public pengajian at mosques not associated with JI from where they 
were “guided” into a smaller, more exclusive pengajian before eventually taking the bai’at.27 
The looser nature of the joining process is evident when looking at how Tatag Lusianto alias 
Awang became a member of JI. Awang was identified as a potential recruit in 2001 when he 
asked whether the Poso conflict was a jihad at a public, non-JI, pengajian but it was only in 
2004 that he was approached by someone at the mosque who then invited him to his house. 
Having explored Awang’s views in casual conversation, Awang was given a book on the 
historic struggle of DI leader Kartosuwirjo and his efforts to establish an Islamic state. This 
was followed by further conversations. Awang was then invited to more exclusive pengajian. 
There, he acquired a new circle of friends. He even set up an inter-pengajian study forum 
called FORMAT, showing how central these Islamic study sessions and groups had become 
to his new life. FORMAT became involved in the recovery activities after Yogyakarta was 
struck by an earthquake in 2006.  It was only after these humanitarian aid efforts were 
completed that Awang was approached by a member of JI who invited him to join the special 
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pengajian which would lead directly to the bai’at and to becoming a member of JI and its 
exclusive community.   
Like Yusuf, it took Awang years to move from first being identified to taking the 
bai’at.  And as with Yusuf, the formation of new relationships was crucial to Awang’s 
acceptance into JI. However, unlike Yusuf’s tightly controlled and highly organised process 
with a carefully designed MTI curriculum, Awang’s was much less rigorous in terms of 
progression and selection criteria as well as Islamic and ideological training.  While this has 
arguably changed the quality of some of the members of this new JI, as a result of having to 
rely on selecting potential recruits at pengajian held by mainstream organisations or on 
university campuses, this has also broadened the pool of potential members and has allowed 
JI to target specific types of individuals. Indeed, JI’s end of year report by its Directorate of 
Tarbiyyah (Islamic education) for 2013-14 shows that JI was strategically trying to recruit 
university students, doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, chemists, information 
technologists, mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, and metallurgists in order to build 
an Islamic society as the foundation upon which to establish an Islamic state.
28
  
Even with the rise of the internet and social media pengajian remained a key pathway 
as can be seen when looking at the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. As one jihadi explained:  
If you join a Telegram channel or Facebook group you need to be active. If you are 
not active in the discussions the assumption is that you are a spy and you would be 
kicked out. Then, after a while, a direct contact would be set up through Facebook or 
Telegram like an invitation to a study group.
29
 
Thus, while the entry point was online, the actual process of joining the pro-ISIS community 
was through personal contact and forming social bonds, which signalled true commitment.  
One such pro-ISIS group conducting pengajian was led by Syamsudin Uba who 
described his role as “telling people about the concept of al-Baghdadi.”30 He held pengajian 
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for separate groups of men, women, the youth, and the general public “to socialise the 
caliphate.” In the early days he even held Islamic study sessions on campus – until he was 
kicked out. As Uba’s group Al-Aqsha Haqquna  was originally established as a pro-Palestine 
organisation, Uba also used Palestine pengajian to spread the ISIS message and as a hook for 
recruiting into his pro-ISIS pengajian.  For instance, at a tabligh akbar (mass religious 
meeting) he held on 30 July 2017 “we told them [the people attending the meeting] that [the] 
al-Aqsa [mosque] will not be liberated without the caliphate. So joining the caliphate is the 
only way [to liberate Palestine].” After such public sermons, there would always be a follow-




As in Jemaah Islamiyah, the pengajian had different levels. As Uba explained: “We 
need to see that they qualify before they go to the next level. This is a process. They need to 
read the Quran. They need to fast on Mondays and Thursdays. We look at them. We look at 
the family. Are they just talking or is this truly their belief?”32 Once an individual has passed 
through these steps and passed all necessary evaluations, they would come to a point where 
the next level of commitment would be ascertained. In this case, that meant hijrah 
(migration) to Syria for jihad or to live in the ISIS caliphate. If an individual was deemed to 
be ready, he would “get instructions via Telegram on how to link up with [the Indonesian 
commander of the ISIS Southeast Asia battalion] Bahrumsyah.”33  Thus, for Indonesian ISIS 
supporters, true commitment necessitated first establishing new relational ties with other ISIS 
supporters in Indonesia and then abandoning their entire social network for a new life in 
Syria.  
 
The Local Conflict Pathway 
The desire to defend Muslim communities under attack motivated hundreds of 
Indonesians to go to Afghanistan in the 1980s, to the Philippines in the 1990s, and to Syria 
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since 2013. Training or fighting in Afghanistan or the Southern Philippines served as a 
commitment point for those who had already joined an Islamist extremist group and taken the 
bai’at while the Syria conflict since 2013 served both as an entry point and commitment 
point reflecting its glocal dynamics.
34
 Between 1998 and 2007, Indonesians also joined local 
jihads in the context of the communal conflicts, which had erupted in Poso (Central Sulawesi 
province) in December 1998 and in Ambon (Maluku province) in January 1999. Of the 106 
individuals in the dataset used by this article, 21 joined Indonesian militant Islamist groups as 
a result of these local conflicts, making this pathway the second most frequently cited. 
The communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso originated from social, political and 
economic shifts resulting from decades of in-migration of Indonesians from other parts of the 
country, the centralizing and uniformizing policies of the Suharto regime, and the real and 
perceived Islamization of Indonesia in the 1990s. The  violence saw Muslims and Christians 
pitted against each other, churches and mosques targeted, and religion used for mobilization. 
Not surprisingly both Ambon and Poso became an entry point into jihad and jihadi 
organizations for a host of Indonesian Muslims, those who were living in those conflict areas 
and those living in other parts of Indonesia, notably Java, who were motivated by feelings of 
solidarity. The latter arrived in response to the first extreme violence against local Muslims 
which in the Ambon conflict came in the form of the organised targeting of Muslim migrants 
by Ambonese Christians in January 1999.
 35
 In the Poso conflict this extreme violence was 
the Walisongo massacre in May 2000, which saw more than 100 students at the local 
Walisongo Islamic boarding school and migrants from the nearby transmigration location 
hacked to death by local Christians.
36
  For both Javanese mujahidin and local mujahidin 
interpersonal and social relationships became a strong motivating factor - to go, to join, to 
stay, and to participate in the violence. This is most obvious when looking at the Afghan 
alumni in JI as well as Poso’s Mujahidin Kayamanya and Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh. These 
13 
 
relationships also became a key factor in continuing the jihad even after the communal 
conflicts had ended -  Poso in December 2001 and Ambon in February 2002. This continuing 
jihad was characterised by revenge attacks in both areas by extremist Muslims until 2005 in 
Ambon and 2007 in Poso. In Poso, moreover, the strong social bonds and networks of former 
combatants allowed for a re-emergence of violence from 2012 to 2016. 
 The first Javanese to arrive in Ambon in February 1999 came through KOMPAK, the 
humanitarian aid wing of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), which set up a 
coordinating office in the Waihaong area of Ambon city through which all outside 
organisations were subsequently channelled and allocated local bases. KOMPAK became the 
main avenue for Indonesian Muslims seeking to volunteer in Ambon either in a humanitarian 
or military capacity. This included members of Jemaah Islamiyah who were frustrated by the 
initial reluctance of JI to commit fighters. KOMPAK’s openness turned the Ambon conflict 
into a pathway into jihad for anyone who wanted to volunteer as well as a pathway into what 
became “Mujahidin” KOMPAK. Jemaah Islamiyah, in contrast, was and remained exclusive; 
its volunteers were already members and most of them, like their military commander 
Zulkarnaen, were Afghan veterans, who already had strong social bonds and had formed a 
kinship-like community within JI. Moreover, many had gone to Ambon before the JI central 
leadership had given the green light and some had gone in complete defiance of the JI 
leadership. They had done so because as Afghan veterans they believed that they had the duty 
to defend fellow Muslims irrespective of political considerations and because Zulkarnaen had 
asked them to. Many went through KOMPAK, which was eased by the fact that KOMPAK’s 
leader Arismundar was also a member of JI and an Afghan alumnus.  
Among the early KOMPAK volunteers were Jek Harun, Asep Jaja, and Abu Sayyaf  
who  were motivated by feelings of solidarity, by the desire to help Ambon’s Muslims “with 
rebuilding the houses”,37 and to provide aid to the displaced Muslims.38  The subsequent 
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transition from humanitarian aid worker to jihadi was a simple one. When Abu Sayyaf 
realised that it “was not possible to deliver the humanitarian aid without being armed” he 
“joined military training for 5 days” including “training with automatic weapons.”39 
Aput, who joined a year later in 2000, after KOMPAK had opened its doors to anyone 
who wanted to go, had a remarkably similar pathway, except that KOMPAK was now using 
the conflict and its humanitarian mission to actively recruit for Mujahidin KOMPAK.  Aput 
was a student at Trisakti University in Jakarta when the Ambon conflict erupted, and because 
he was interested in the conflict he started attending meetings held by DDII and by the 
Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI) where they were shown 
videos on the communal violence which were then followed by discussion. He “felt called to 
go to Ambon to help” so he became a volunteer for DDII to deliver humanitarian aid and 
“signed up with KOMPAK to go to Ambon”. 40 He was sent to Seram island, next to Ambon, 
to deliver aid and “on the way we were shot at.” Upon his return to the KOMPAK office in 
Waihaong, KOMPAK’s coordinator and military commander  “Abdullah Sunata asked us 
whether we wanted to return to Java as our mission was completed or whether we would like 
to join the military training and help defend the Muslims.” 41 He decided to join the military 
training at a camp in East Seram where he studied fiqh jihad (Islamic jurisprudence on jihad) 




While volunteers from Java were motivated by the desire to help and defend fellow 
Muslims, revenge was among the main motivations of local Muslims. One local Ambonese 
mujahidin leader cited “Muslims being terrorised out of the areas where they were 
minorities”43 as his reason for wanting to fight, while one Muslim child fighter joined 
because he wanted to “defend my religion but also because my older brother died.”44 In the 
Poso conflict, the Walisongo massacre in May 2000 became the single most referred to 
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reason for locals wanting to become mujahidin. As one member of the Mujahidin Tanah 
Runtuh explained: “After Walisongo, we wanted revenge”.45  Others concurred stating that 
they were angry after they saw the bodies floating down the river, “five to six bodies every 
day and I don’t know how many at night”,46 “the bodies of women, children, babies – 
mutilated.”47 
The Javanese mujahidin in both conflicts set out to improve local military capacity. In 
Ambon, KOMPAK and JI trained local Muslims but did not formally partner with affiliate 
groups, viewing them as “unsuitable” and “unreceptive” for anything other than military 
training.
48
 This differed greatly from Poso, where the population was deemed to be duly 
“receptive.”49 It was this receptiveness alongside Poso’s strategic position which made the 
leadership of JI’s mantiqi (region) III consider establishing a qoidah aminah (secure base) 
there.
50
 Like in the Ambon conflict, KOMPAK was the first to enter. This time it was 
followed quickly by JI around August 2000 and both established local affiliates: Mujahidin 
KOMPAK affiliated with local fighters in the Kayamanya neighbourhood and JI with the 
community around Tanah Runtuh. The primary differences between JI’s and Mujahidin 
KOMPAK’s recruitment process was  that JI instituted a modified version of their  pengajian 
pathway at Tanah Runtuh while Mujahidin KOMPAK ran a three to four week course which 
focused on military training, preferring a “learning by doing” approach.51 
Islamic study sessions were central to the process of becoming a member of 
Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh and this differentiated it from Mujahidin Kayamanya as well as the 
Ambon conflict as a whole. Of the 21 individuals who cited local conflict as key to their 
joining an Islamist extremist group, 12 attended Islamic study sessions at Tanah Runtuh.  
They explained that in the weeks following the Walisongo massacre, ustadz from JI began 
arriving and held public Islamic studies sessions in certain local mosques. For local attendees, 
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As “BR”, who was in the first batch of volunteers, recalled “the pengajian took place 
after the evening prayer in the Bonesompe neighbourhood of Poso city. The imam announced 
it and invited anyone interested to stay. So I decided to stay”.53  Reflecting on what he 
learned in the pengajian, B.R. noted he and his peers gained a shared understanding of 
Islamic brotherhood and how jihad was an obligation from which they could not run. 
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”Yuda,” who was also in the first batch, explained that those who attended the pengajian 
learned “the meaning of jihad”, “how to wage jihad” and “how to recognize a kafir 
(unbeliever).”55 While the youth attendees in Poso were learning to reframe their desire for 
revenge against the Christians as seeking and obtaining justice, the Javanese ustadz holding 
these study sessions were noting regular attendees and checked their background.
 56
  BR, 
“after maybe 7 times” attending Islamic studies sessions, was invited to join the tadrib 
(military training). “They told us to bring sports clothes, a change of clothes, a towel, soap, 
toothbrush and a Quran”.57 The training lasted for a week and the 30 volunteers were taught 
“the study of strategy, tactics, warfare, force formation, how to shoot, camouflage, making 
bombs, and protecting yourself from the enemy.” 58  
For the first batch of volunteers, tadrib came right after the public Islamic studies 
sessions as fighters were desperately needed and their “instructors were ex-Afghan veterans - 
11 persons.”59 Subsequent batches moved to special Islamic studies sessions and only then to 
tadrib, where their instructors and later their commanders were the star pupils from the first 
batch like BR. With this new manpower and immediate security needs addressed through the 
first batch, tadrib also became more flexible with a more intensive option of 3 full days as 
well as a less intensive 3 week option evenings only.
60
 The process was then completed with 
dauroh (group internal Islamic studies) which focused on the Islamic community, the 
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caliphate and the bai’at.’ 61 The ustadz determined when you were ready to move on to the 
next stage as a result of which “some persons from the first batch took their bai’at with the 
third batch.”62 Until the bai’at none of the volunteers were aware that they being recruited by 
JI. 
As BR recalled: “I knew it was an Islamic community but I did not know it was an 
organisation” [at the time].63  Those interviewed reported that even at the time of the bai’at, 
they were still unaware that their teachers and trainers were JI. This is not all too surprising as 
a bai’at is always made to a person rather than an organisation. Those who joined Mujahidin 
Tanah Runtuh recalled making their bai’at to Abu Rusdan who was a member of JI’s central 
board and Abu Tholut, then the head of JI’s mantiqi III, or later to Poso Muslim leader, Haji 
Adnan Arsal,
64
 whose Islamic boarding school became the base of Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh.   
The pengajian and training provided the volunteers and later members of Mujahidin 
Tanah Runtuh and Mujahidin Kayamana with a like-minded peer group, which shared the 
experiences of the conflict, a sense of vengeful solidarity, an ideological prism to legitimate 
that desire for revenge, and the experience of induction into their respective organisations. 
The social bonds formed during the induction were further reinforced by the shared 
experience of defending neighbours together and carrying out attacks together against 
Christians and the security forces. These peer relationships, moreover, developed kinship-like 
characteristics as the jihadi brethren moved into the space left by their families which had 
been killed, dispersed, and displaced to safer areas outside Poso. The new jihadi family 
strengthened their resolve and motivated members of Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh and 
Mujahidin Kayamanya in no uncertain terms.  
The social bonds formed during the Ambon and Poso conflict also ensured that 
enduring and reliable networks existed after the conflicts ended. These have subsequently 
been drawn upon to establish new pro-ISIS militant Islamist organisations in the area and 
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have played a key role in recruiting new members into them.  One such organisation is 
Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) which was established in Poso in late 2012 under the 
leadership of Santoso, who himself had been a member of Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh. Santoso 
drew upon these relationships, unaddressed Muslim grievances from the Poso conflict, and 
the desire for revenge against the police to recruit local Muslims into his new group. Another 
example is the Indonesian ISIS network more broadly, which actively sought out Ambon and 
Poso alumni as they had prior combat experience. The most prominent of these was Abu 
Walid who went to Ambon with Mujahidin KOMPAK in 1999 where he fought under the 
name of Kholid. In December 2013, he departed for Syria to join the jihad against the Bashar 





The Kinship pathway 
The literature on terrorism notes that kinship is an important mechanism for 
recruitment.
66
 This is especially true for Jemaah Islamiyah. Kinship provides unmatched 
loyalty and unconditional support, as it is not only the ties of in-group solidarity that bind but 
also the actual familial ties that ensure commitment.  In joining, kinship ties create more 
flexible pathways to entry; in some instances, they expedite the route into the group, 
bypassing pengajian altogether.  In conducting illicit activities, familial ties reduce the 
likelihood of infiltration.
67
 Kinship also makes disengagement far more difficult, as one risks 
severing ties with parents, children, spouses and siblings, should one depart the group, and it 
makes recidivism more likely as relatives can put pressure via familial bonds to lure someone 
back in.  
 Due to the longstanding history of Indonesian jihadi groups there are 
multigenerational jihadi families, where the parents were members of Darul Islam, who 
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subsequently joined JI following the split. Some sent their children to JI schools. When they 
married and had children themselves, they followed the same path. The multigenerational 
jihadi tradition and its intersection with a radical Islamic education in a handful of boarding 
schools is possibly unique to Indonesia. It has also been largely unique to Jemaah Islamiyah, 
which is the only salafi-jihadi organization in Indonesia that has an extensive school network.  
This tradition of what Sidney Jones termed “inherited jihadism” can also be seen with  the 
involvement of Indonesian jihadis in conflicts abroad where the sons of those who joined the 
Afghan jihad in the 1980s have, in turn, joined the Syrian jihad. 
68
 
Of those interviewed, 11 joined through via kinship.  There are four main routes. The 
most common is through parents where one is actually born into jihad, socialized by parents 
into the jihadi worldview, and sent to the right jihadi schools to be groomed to become a 
member of a jihadi organization. The jihadi community is at the core of one’s social network 
from childhood. The second route is through siblings. Here the pattern is that older siblings 
often recruited younger siblings, although they did not necessarily persuade their older 
siblings to follow them. The third is through extended family members such as uncles who 
groomed a specific nephew to follow them from a young age.  The fourth is through marriage 
which has served to consolidate in-group social ties and commitment to the organization.  
 One example of being born into a jihadi family is Abu Rusdan, son of Darul Islam 
leader Haji Muhammad Faleh.
69
  Due to his family ties, Abu Rusdan’s pathway into Darul 
Islam and subsequently JI was expedited. He explained, “my circumstance made me close to 
them. I often interacted with them so they trusted me.”70 Abu Rusdan was inducted into the 
group at the age of 15.
71
 He fought in Afghanistan, was a member of JI’s central board, and 
briefly served as interim amir in the 2000s.  
Another example of joining via the parents is “Hisham,” a dai (preacher) with JI who 
came from a Darul Islam family and whose father had been a subordinate of JI’s founder, 
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Abdullah Sungkar before Sungkar established JI.  Hisham’s parents, all of his siblings and 
their spouses all joined Jemaah Islamiyah. When he was little, he recalls, veterans of the 
Soviet-Afghan war visited his house and his father took him to the tabligh (mass religious 
meeting) that Abdullah Sungkar held every weekend. Thus, he was socialized from a very 
young age into salafi-jihadi ideas.  His parents also sent the boys to salafi-jihadi schools 
affiliated with Sungkar’s network, with his elder brother attending Al-Mukmim, Abdullah 
Sungkar’s own pesantren, and Hisham being sent to Al-Islam in the early 1990s.72 Al-Islam 
represented the second stage in his socialization process not only into JI but also into 
becoming a mujahid. When he graduated in 1997, he took the bai’at, noting that 
Actually, I had no idea what JI was. I just knew this was a community that fought for 
Islam through war. I joined them because since I was a kid, my father told me he 
would like me to die as a martyr and I always dreamed I would.
73
 
 Hisham’s joining process illustrates how family ties and educational ties reinforced one 
another. He was socialized from an extremely young age into the JI community. What stands 
out to him is not what he learned but with whom  and from whom he learned it. He did not 
fully understand what he was joining, only that it would enable him to live out the purpose 
his father had set for him - to die a martyr.   
There are also several recent instances where sons of veterans of the Afghan jihad 
have gone to join the Syrian jihad, thereby carrying on the family jihadi tradition. The most 
prominent of these were Umar Abdul Azis, son of Bali bombing mastermind Imam Samudra, 
who joined ISIS; 
74
 Rusydan Abdul Hadi, son of Afghan veteran Amir Mahmud, who also 
joined ISIS 
75
  and Ridwan Abdul Hayyie, son of Abu Jibril, who joined a local jihadi 
group.
76
 In these instances, however, it was not parents intentionally socializing their child 
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into a particular group or sending their children to Syria but the adult children themselves 
who made the decision to follow in their fathers’ footsteps. 
Older brothers also brought younger siblings into Jemaah Islamiyah without parental 
approval or encouragement. For example, Mukhlas, former commander of JI’s Mantiqi I 
brought younger brothers, Ali Imron and Amrozi and younger half-brother Ali Fauzi into 
Jemaah Islamiyah. In fact, Mukhlas had been grooming Ali Imron since the age of 10. As a 
result, Ali Imron had an expedited joining process. He did not have to spend years in 
pengajian. Instead, he took the bai’at and went to Afghanistan on the strength of Mukhlas’ 
recommendation. As he explained, 
I heard from my friends, who studied alongside me in the Afghanistan Mujahidin 
Military Academy that they joined JI through education first. They were educated by 
Darul Islam members in their respective areas. They already knew that the pengajian 
they attended would be different from pengajian organized by [the mainstream 
organizations] Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. They already knew about Darul 
Islam, its mission and vision, when they were sent from Indonesia to Malaysia. In 
contrast, I did not know. I only knew that Mukhlas had a community or a group or an 
organization because Mukhlas often talked about it when I was a kid. He told me that 
he had a community and was an ustadz. I didn’t understand the details. Hence when I 
wanted to join Mukhlas, the only thing I knew and  possessed was Mukhlas….I felt I 
was the most special. The process was special because it was so fast. I was not from a 
JI pesantren (Islamic boarding school). I spent a very short time [one month] at Al-
Mukmin. I was never educated [Islamically]. I never joined halaqah sessions.
77
  
Ali Imron’s experience was somewhat unique among the 11 cases of kinship examined. 
Among the siblings that Mukhlas recruited into JI, only Ali Imron was allowed this expedited 
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trajectory, as Mukhlas deemed him to be ideologically ready for participation in jihad and in 
his community. His brother, Amrozi, and half-brother, Ali Fauzi, who joined later, after Ali 
Imron had already left for Afghanistan, were not deemed as “ready.” They both went through 
courses of religious study at the Luqmanul Hakim Islamic boarding school in Malaysia in 
order to cultivate the correct mindset, devotion, commitment, and temperament.   
When siblings joined Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia, rather than being born 
into them, they either joined together or an older sibling recruited a younger one. Even in 
large families, younger siblings typically did not or were not able to recruit the older ones.  
While Mukhlas brought his younger brothers, Amrozi and Ali Imron, into Jemaah Islamiyah, 
he was not able or did not attempt to recruit his four older siblings. Similarly, the twins 
Saifuddin and Nurudin, JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK members and Ambon veterans, joined 
together but they did not recruit older brother Muinudinillah.  
Another type of kinship socialization is through an extended family member. Two of 
those who joined Islamist extremist groups in the dataset of this article did so through uncles. 
Here too familial social ties were used to frame the joining process as is illustrated by “Abu 
Azzam”, who was systematically groomed by his uncle for almost a decade from 2000 to 
2009 to join Al Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago led by Noordin M. Top. The grooming of 
Abu Azzam started when he was still in school. 
[In the beginning] he would often invite me to climb mountains with him. Or go 
hiking or swimming.  [He would then introduce me to people] “Syahrir is from JI. 
He’s good at using weapons.” He taught me jihad in a subtle manner. We often had 
small talks, “about this, what do you think.”78 
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 When this grooming process came to fruition “Abu Azzam” already had a college 
degree and a steady job. However, his uncle was able to involve him in his cell and in the 
preparation of an attack on the basis on their relationship. 
I studied psychology [at university] but he had a better understanding than me in 
practicing psychology.  We were getting closer. He always called me and asked me 
where I was. “Could you please take me somewhere? Could you please accompany 
me?” I only knew afterward that when he asked me to take him somewhere, we were 
meeting Noordin [M. Top]. I met Noordin several times but I did not know he was 
Noordin. [I also met] Afham, Soni and Dr. Azahari. He knew I would reject pengajian 
because I had already studied religion in religious school and felt I no longer needed 
to attend religious study. Hence, the way he approached me was great. He knew what 
I liked and what I didn’t like….He was a disciplined person…. He had his cell. He 
had his network. He was not very open about it. I only knew when I was already on 
the inside. Suddenly, ten people visited me. Then he explained who they were. He 
wanted me to be comfortable. He knew I rejected bombing so he needed to make me 
love him first. Then, finally, he said, “if someday you are with me, would you 
participate in a bombing?” He was able to make me say “yes I would do it for you.”79 
In this instance, his uncle systematically cultivated him as an asset, built up their relationship, 
and in doing so, caused him to abandon his internal sense of right and wrong. As with 
Mukhlas and Ali Imron it was the relationship which drove the membership, as opposed to 
ideology or specific grievances.  
Within a discussion of kinship, it is also necessary to talk about the role of marriage. 
Marriage can function as a pathway to entry. However, most often, it has functioned as a 
commitment point.  Within militant Islamist groups broadly, marriage has been a way of 
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solidifying in-group ties by finding a partner from the group, thus ensuring any offspring will 
be raised to share the group’s worldview and ideally, become members in good standing 
themselves in time. Within JI and DI, as with other Java-based Muslim groups, in-
groupmarriage has been commonplace.
80
 It would be expected that someone from a JI or DI 
family would have their marriage arranged to a female member of the group. Even for those 
who joined JI and DI through pengajian, marriage became a way to show commitment to the 
organization. Yusuf, for example, whose  pathway was discussed in the  Islamic study 
sesssions section, had his marriage arranged while in prison to a member of the JI women’s 
wing in Semarang. Until the 2017 school year, he was sending his children to a JI school in 
Semarang, thus ensuring they would be raised with the correct Islamic worldview, even 
though his activities in JI were minimal.  His marriage and connections to his wife and her 
family ensured that JI will always be part of his larger social network. 
Marriage has also played a role in Indonesia’s pro-ISIS network. Here, in addition to 
traditional arranged marriages there were also “secret marriages” and the result of “meeting” 
on Facebook or in a Telegram group, although it should be pointed out that the first “online 
marriage” was in Noordin M.Top’s network. While marriages in the pro-ISIS network, DI, 
and JI all were a commitment point, in JI and DI they served to strengthen the social bonds 
within the in-group and loyalty to the network. By contrast, some marriages in the pro-ISIS 
network in Indonesia - as opposed to those in Syria – served to underwrite terror attacks. The 
most prominent of these is Dian Yulia Novi who would have become Indonesia’s first female 
suicide bomber had she not been arrested on her way to attack the presidential palace. 
According to her deposition, Dian met her husband Muhammad Nur Solikin through 
Facebook and married him secretly by proxy through representatives arranged by Solikin. 
They only met for the first time two days after their marriage in October 2016. In November, 
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on their second meeting they both took the bai’at to ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, and 




The School/pesantren pathway 
Both Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah have their own networks of schools, 
madrasas, and pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). Many of these were founded by Darul 
Islam members, who went on to join Jemaah Islamiyah and took their school with them. 
Schools as a means of recruitment have largely been a Jemaah Islamiyah-specific pathway.  
There are estimated to be between 40 and 60 schools affiliated with JI.
82
 The most notable for 
jihadi recruitment historically have been Al-Mukmim in the village of Ngruki near Solo, 
which is currently affiliated with Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS); Al-Islam in Lamongan; 
Al-Mutaqin in Jepara; Darus Syahadah in Boyali; and the now closed Luqmanul Hakim in 
Malaysia’s Johor state.83 Pro-ISIS groups lack such a schools network. There have been a few 
schools associated with ISIS, most notably, Ibnu Mas’ud in Bogor, founded by the leader of 
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, Aman Abdurrahman. 
The Jemaah Islamiyah school system was and remains completely self-contained, 
beginning with playgroups to socialize the children in the salafi-jihadi tradition before they 
know any other alternatives.
84
 They then move to kindergartens to study the Quran and 
elementary schools before being sent to a JI-affiliated boarding school. 
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  Students can enter 
and exit at any time; some complete the entire system, while others enter this educational 
system at middle school or high school.  
The purpose of these schools has been the cultivation of a network of graduates 
sympathetic to the salafi-jihadi worldview and understanding of Islam. However, a small 
proportion of those students (approximately 6-8 per cohort) who attended the school would 
be offered the opportunity to attend the extra-curricular religious study groups which could 
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potentially lead to eventual recruitment.
86
 JI parents who send their children to JI schools do 
so with the intention that their sons will follow fathers into the group while daughters will be 
educated to become the wives of group members. For example, for Farihin Ahmad, a JI 
member from a multigenerational jihadi family who was involved in the 2000 attack against 
the Philippine ambassador, JI schools reinforced the messages he gave his own children about 
the necessity of jihad and increased the likelihood that his children would have the 
opportunity to follow in their father’s footsteps.87 However, those on the margins of JI also 
send their children to JI schools, for they see the schools’ approach aligning to their personal 
religious principles.  For example, Yusuf (see pengajian pathway), explained that he had sent 
his school-aged children to a Jemaah Islamiyah affiliated elementary school because they 
separated boys from girls and he deemed the quality of education better compared to other 
schools in the area. 
88
  
M.B., a JI member first recruited into Darul Islam while a student at Al-Mukmin 
Islamic boarding school in the 1980s described the assessment metrics that were utilized in 
recruitment at the school while it was a Darul Islam and subsequently a JI school. He 
contended the screening process began as early as middle school and was undertaken with 
great care, examining the behaviour in religious study outside of formal pesantren activities 
and in one’s daily activities. Recruiters observed students in Quran study. Who was diligently 
participating? They took note of their potential recruit’s character: did they lie; did they break 
the rules; did they dress appropriately; were they calm; were they intelligent; were they clean, 
etc…  They would be visited by the designated recruiters and invited to join Quran study 
groups and extra classes such as martial arts. They would be observed through these extra-
curricular activities and it would be ascertained who had the potential to be recruited. Once 
they reached their second year of senior high school, if they passed that stage, they were then 
ready for dauroh, group internal study sessions over several evenings where potential 
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members were briefed on the history of Darul Islam, on the necessity of continuing the 
struggle, on intelligence, and other matters before they ultimately took the bai’at .89 
 According to M.B. the process of being recruited at Al-Mukmin into what was Darul 
Islam in the 1980s and the process of being recruited into Jemaah Islamiyah following the 
split in 1993 was quite similar, insofar as both targeted the same kind of youth with the same 
core set of personality characteristics: loyalty, religious fervour, obedience, cleanliness, 
calmness, and intelligence - and both recruited at the same point, senior high school. He 
noted, however, that JI was far more cautious in the recruitment process than Darul Islam.  
Solahudin notes that only top students from safe family backgrounds were considered for 
recruitment; it was rare for JI to recruit someone from a military or police family.
90
  
Moreover, the course of study in the extra-curricular study groups differed, as JI study groups 
highlighted the MTI materials. 
91
 According to Solahudin, after they had learned the material, 
they would take a religious course designed to reinforce what they had been learning; this 
was the final stage prior to induction.
92
 As one Al-Mukmin graduate who was interviewed by 
Solahudin explained: 
I became a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah organization in 1994, when I was in 
sixth class at the Al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, Solo. At the time, 
my friends and I took part in the MTI studies taught by Ustad Abdul Rohim, Ustad 
Joko and Ustad Mukhlis for around 10 days. When it was over, Ustad Joko invited my 
friends and me to take the oath as members of Jemaah Islamiyah.
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Hisham’s description of joining JI via the schools pathway at the Al-Islam pesantren 
in Lamongan following graduation echoes similar themes.  As he came from a JI family, he 
would have been considered a safe recruit. He took the typical slate of classes, including 
Arabic, English and sharia, and likely was observed for his performance. While Hisham did 
not discuss being invited into extra-curricular study groups, he elaborated on the paramilitary 
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aspects of recruitment. While at Al-Islam, he met JI members who had just returned from 
training in Mindanao; he learned knowledge of jihad from Ali Imron; and he was taught how 
to shoot.
94
 He explained the actual joining with almost an air of inevitability. He did his 
dauroh with Mukhlas for a week.  In either 1996 or 1997, following graduation, members of 
JI’s Surabaya branch appeared, recruited the fresh graduates and gave them their tasks. He 
took the bai’at in 1997. 
Hisham also highlighted that the teacher-student discipleship relationship was among 
the most powerful social bonds to emerge from the schools pathway, notably, his experience 
as a student of Ali Imron.  He explains, “When I was at Al-Islam, Ali Imron was my role 
model in jihad.”95 The bond between the teacher and student persisted after he graduated. 
When Hisham wanted to go to Mindanao to fight in a jihad rather than continue to work as a 
da’i (preacher), he reached out to Ali Imron for help.96  When Imron went on the run 
following the Bali bombing, he sought out Hisham to accompany him. 
97
 Hisham contends 
Ali Imron still remains “his” ustad, and they converse weekly via Moto GP, Blackberry 
Messenger or WhatsApp chat.
98
   
 Hisham noted that the pesantren’s approach changed somewhat following the first 
Bali bombings in 2002. Whereas he was taught practical applications of jihad such as 
shooting in addition to the traditional coursework, in the aftermath of the Bali bombing, the 
school curriculum was revised to focus on “regular Islamic subjects” like sharia and aqidah 
and away from jihad in practice. 
99
  
 Looking at the schools pathway there are clear commonalities between those students 
who joined Darul Islam in the 1980s and JI in the 1990s at Al-Mukmim and at Al-Islam. 
They were carefully selected. They were chosen based on personality characteristics, degree 
of commitment, and, for JI, having the right family background.  As they reached the second 
year of high school, they were offered the opportunity for extra-curricular instruction in 
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Islamic studies that went beyond what was typically on offer at the school as well as 
instruction in martial arts and sports. To varying degrees, depending on the school, there was 
also some form of paramilitary training, although this was muted following the 2002 Bali 
bombings as attention turned to the JI pesantren, due to the affiliation of the bombers with 
specific schools. Either just prior to or just following graduation, they would be formally 
inducted into the group.  Together with the family pathway, schools provided a steady stream 
of members into DI and JI and socialized a wider portion of the population into becoming 
sympathizers and supporters of those who had formerly been their playmates and peers. 
While schools are not a prominent pathway in the pro-ISIS community, there are a 
few schools worthy of mention. Pesantren Anshorullah in Ciamis and Miftahul Huda in 
Subang were involved in preparations for the 2016 Jakarta bombing.   The most well known 
pro-ISIS school is Ibnu Mas’ud, which opened in Depok in 2009 before moving to Bogor in 
2011. Founded by Aman Abdurrahman, the school aimed to socialize children as young as 
four into the takfiri ideology. 
100
  According to Sofyan Tsauri, an ex-militant who was 
involved in the Aceh training camp in 2010, the school had a dual function: first, to educate 
the children of jihadis and, second, to serve as a safe house for fugitive extremists.
101
 When 
Aman Abdurrahman swore bai’at to Abu Bakar al Baghdadi, the school became affiliated 
with the pro-ISIS network.  Indeed, as of July 2017, eight teachers and four students had gone 
to fight in Syria or had attempted to go, while another 18 from the school had been arrested 
or convicted on charges of plotting or carrying out terror attacks.
102
   
 
Conclusion 
This article examined four major points of entry into Islamist extremist groups in 
Indonesia: pengajian, local conflict, kinship and schools.  In all of these, social bonds have 
featured prominently. In the schools pathway, these have been bonds among peers and 
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between teachers and students. In JI circles in particular, one embarked on an extended multi-
tiered process of indoctrination leading ultimately to induction. This process enabled a 
winnowing out of those who appear to show less commitment or who showed flaws in their 
character. The process of moving through those layers of Islamic study sessions also created 
intense bonds between teacher and student and among in-group members.  While this 
pathway became less rigorous over the last decade, as JI attempted to widen its support base, 
there was still sufficient time spent in the pengajian to build ties of affinity, mentorship and 
friendship. The same has held true for Islamic study sessions sponsored by pro-ISIS groups 
In the conflict pathway, for the local fighters, the shared experience of trauma amid 
the communal violence, the shared desire for revenge, and, if a member of Mujahidin Tanah 
Runtuh, the bonding that occurred within the study group, fostered a similar unified sense of 
identity.  The Javanese mujahidin who went to Ambon and Poso to fight were driven by a 
common sense of solidarity with their fellow Muslims; loyalty to in-movement seniors like 
Zulkarnaen who asked them to join the fight; and a common understanding that this was a 
defensive jihad and thus, their presence was required given their skill set. While the 
communal conflicts have ended, groups like Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT) reopened the 
struggle against the Indonesian police, inspired by those same feelings of vengeful solidarity 
that drove the initial recruits to Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh and Mujahidin Kayamanya.   
 The kinship pathway differed markedly from the first two. Socialization into Jemaah 
Islamiyah or Darul Islam started from a young age.  Parents, uncles and elder siblings 
exposed them into the right worldview, sent them to the right schools, and introduced them to 
the right people. In some instances, youth from jihadi families would have an expedited 
pathway to entry; in other cases, they would be sent to a JI or DI-affiliated boarding school. 
Eventually when the time came for them, he or she would typically marry someone from 
another JI/DI family or from a JI-affiliated school, thus further solidifying the commitment 
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and perpetuating those linkages over the next generations. In some cases, relatives targeted 
specific younger nephews or siblings for recruitment over the long term and systematically 
groomed them, drawing on in-family love and loyalty to ensure commitment.  In other cases, 
simply having a parent who fought in a jihad or was executed by the state was sufficient to 
prompt someone to travel to Syria to seek their own jihad experience. However, for those 
inspired by relatives, the familial social bonds provided powerful reinforcement to stay in the 
movement and be a member in good standing as familial loyalty was intertwined with in-
movement loyalty.  
 Finally, within Darul Islam in the 1980s and especially within Jemaah Islamiyah, 
following its split with Darul Islam, radical Islamic boarding schools also provided a pathway 
to entry into a circle of sympathizers of the movement and possibly, for those with the right 
temperament, family background and character, membership. The goal of these schools was 
to create a community of like-minded individuals sharing a common salafi-jihadi worldview 
that was sympathetic to the JI/DI perspective and goals. It was seen as an important step in 
the process of founding an Islamic society which would become the nucleus of an Islamic 
state after establishing the qoidah aminah (secure base). Of those youths, a small handful 
would be invited to join JI/DI proper. Thus, in contrast to the pengajian pathway, where one 
was expected to narrow one’s social circle and divorce oneself from affiliations to other 
organizations, there was no such requirement for school recruits as they were effectively 
already part of the community. Indeed, the community was both the school and the sub-
jamaah that existed within it. At the time of writing, there has been no evidence of the pro-
ISIS groups attempting to build a broader schools network although there are some affiliated 
schools. While they have recruited from among the alumni of the radical boarding schools 
and have recruited from state schools and universities, they have preferred to work through 
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